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BROKER-DEALER SELLING PRACTICE STANDARDS:
THE IMPORTANCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ADJUDICATION IN THEIR DEVELOPMENT*
MANUEL F. CoHENI AND JoEL J. RABINt
The debate on the merits of the administrative process continues, but the issues
seem to have changed. Earlier critics charged that the agencies were unconstitutional
bodies and that their basic programs infringed individual rights.' In recent years,
the agencies have been assailed on the grounds that their procedures are unfair and
inefficient2 and that they are not adequately performing the tasks with which they
are vested.' There seems to be less criticism of the concept and more concern with
methods, with the result that most recent administrative reforms have been designed
to improve the procedures of individual agencies On a broader scale, the Congress
is currently considering bills which would substantially amend the Administrative
Procedure Act,6 and establish a permanent Administrative Conference of the United
States to study continuously and to advise on agency procedure.6
Not all students of the administrative process have been as critical. A number
have suggested that the agencies generally perform their tasks well, or at least as
effectively as other governmental bodies.7 They point out that much of the criticism
has not been substantiated and that there is a need for study and evaluation of
* This article carries a date of authorship of May 15, 1964. The Securities and Exchange Commission,
as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any private publication by any of its members or
employees. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the Commission or its staff.
tB.S. 1933, Brooklyn College; LL.B. 1936, Brooklyn Law School. Member of the Securities and
Exchange Commission.
* B.S. 1957, LL.B. i96I, University of Wisconsin. Legal Assistant to Mr. Cohen.
'See I KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.04 (1958) [hereinafter cited as
DAvis].
E.g., Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69 YALE L.J. 931
(ig6o) (originally prepared as a memorandum from Louis J. Hector to the President, Sept. 1o, i959);
Miller, The Advocate Before Administrative Agencies, 1956 U. ILL. L.F. I89.
'E.g., JAmEs M. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT (i96o) (also
printed in pamphlet form as a committee print of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 86th Cong., ad sess.
(ig6o)); EMMETTE S. REDFORD, NATIONAL REGULATORY CoMMIssIONS-NEED FOR A NEw LooK (1959).
'In the past few years, the problem of inefficiency has been attacked by reorganization plans and
new statutes which permit agencies greater flexibility and authority in the delegation of functions in
many areas of agency responsibility. E.g., Reorganization Plan No. 3 of i96i, 26 Fed. Reg. 5989, 75
Stat. 837 (1961) (CAB reorganization plan); 76 Stat. 394 (1962), 15 U.S.C. § 78d-I (Supp. IV, 1963)
(SEC delegation of functions statute).
' 6o Stat. 237-44 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ zoos-ii (1958). The bill proposing amendments to the act
is S. x663, 88th Cong., ist Sess. (1963).
OS. 1664, H.R. 7200, 88th Cong., ist Sess. (1963).7 E.g., Fick, Issues and Accomplishments in Administrative Regulation: Some Political Aspects, 26
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 283, 306 (i96i); Kintner, The Current Ordeal of the Administrative Process: In
Reply to Mr. Hector, 69 YALE L.J. 95 (196o); Gardner, The Administrative Process, in LEGAL INsTrru.
TiONs TODAY AND TomoRaow io8 (Columbia University Law School, 1959).
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the performance of each agency." The i961-I962 Administrative Conference stimu-
lated excellent studies along these lines.9
This paper will discuss a limited aspect of the operations of the Securities and Ex-
change. Commission (SEC) in relation to two themes of the current criticism: (I)
the charge that policy development and enunciation by the agencies is inadequate,
and particularly that agencies rely too much on adjudication and the ad hoc approach
at the expense of formal rule-making; and (2) the continuing concern with the
combination in most agencies of adjudicatory and other functions. The following
sections elaborate on the nature of these themes and discuss the Commission's de-
velopment of standards for broker-dealers and their salesmen in the sale of securities
and the Commission's internal rules and procedures in the adjudication of cases in
relation to them. Finally, some general thoughts on the administrative process are
offered.
The discussion of Commission rules, cases, and statements of policy is not meant
to be comprehensive nor is any attempt made to analyze them in depth; that task
has been undertaken by others.Y Instead, this paper is meant to illustrate how these
devices have been used to develop and enunciate policy in one area of the Commis-
sion's responsibilities. At the outset, it seems necessary, albeit immodest, to point
out that the Commission has generally fared well in most evaluations of agency
performance and its operations have received significant praise.1 This paper, there-
fore, tests criticisms of the administrative process against an agency considered to be
fairly effective.
CRITICISM OF THE USE OF ADJUDICATION FOR POLICY FORMATION
The term adjudication as used here and throughout the paper is meant to include
all those proceedings in which agencies develop an evidentiary record in hearings
and provide opportunities for briefs and oral arguments to decide controversies
affecting particular parties, whether or not they fall technically within the definition
8 See Bernstein, The Regulatory Process: A Framework for Analysis, 26 LAw & CoTrEM'. PRO. 329
(xg6i).
9 See Selected Reports of the Administrative Conference of the United States, S. Doc. No. 24, 88th
Cong., ist*Sess. (x963); Auerbach, The Federal Trade Commission: Internal Organization and Procedure,
48 MINN. L. REV. 383 (x964).
IL*outs Loss, SEcURITIES REGULATION 1421-45, 1474-158 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as
LOss]; Lesh, Federal Regulation of Over-the-Counter Brokers and Dealers in Securities, 59 HARV. L.
REv. 1237 (1946). Reference was also made to the manuscript of a comprehensive work, tentatively
entitled "Registration and Regulation of Brokers and Dealers," by Mr. Ezra Weiss, which will be
published in the near future by the Bureau of National Affairs.
"Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Adminictrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67 HAuv. L. REv. x1o5,
(1954),,
" 
TisE FORCE REPORT ON REGULATORY CoMMISSIONS, CoMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF TIe
ExCTrTvE BRANCH OF TBE GOVERNMENT 144 (1949). It should also be noted that the Comnission
has been the recipient of censure. Report of Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securiiet
and Exchange Commision, H.R. Doe. No. 95, 88th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 4, at 692-728 (x963) [herein-
after cited as Spdcial Study]; Landis, op. cit. supra note 3, at 45-48. Cf. Barron's, "Guilty Until Proven
InA &nt," Feb. 3, to, and 17, 1964, pP. 1, 3, and 3, respectively; and Barron's, "Who Watches the Watch-
dogs?," Jan. 14, 1963, p. 3.
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of adjudication in the Administrative Procedure Act.P Some of those who
criticize agency reliance on adjudication to develop standards stress that it is an in-
efficient and inadequate method for proper policy development. They point to the
accidental nature of individual cases, the problems caused by inadequate records,
and the slowness of the process; 3 and they say that the technical legal restrictions
surrounding agency adjudication prevent the use of other flexible procedures which
could be used in the search for the best method of solving particular problems.' 4
Other critics do not make such a frontal assault on adjudication as a method for
policy formulation. They concede its value, but contend that some agencies rely
on adjudication almost to the exclusion of alternatives, such as formal rule-making
and publication of statements of policy, which may be more appropriate for the
development of certain standards.' 5 This point of view recognizes that the flexibility
possessed by the courts in developing common law policies and rules is at least of
equal importance in the administrative process. The principal concern expressed
by these critics seems to relate to the need for clear policy formulation regardless of
which method is used.
One of the most articulate and persuasive exponents of this second view is Judge
Henry J. Friendly of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Judge Friendly believes that the failure to define standards more specifically, to
"make law" within the confines of the statutory charter, is the basic deficiency of
agency performance and that, ff this fault is corrected, the other ills of the admin-
istrative process will also be cured.' 6 He believes that the executive and legislative
branches of government and teachers and students of the law can aid in reaching
this goal, but that the first and main responsibility lies with the agencies them-
selves.' In performing this task, the agencies need not abandon the case-by-case
method, even if they could.
Judge Friendly feels, however, that statements of policy and formal rules have
certain advantages over adjudication for defining standards, since they make possible
the avoidance of the trivia and personalities involved in individual cases and permit
agency members to concentrate on the principles involved.18 He suggests that the
development of a policy statement educates the agency members in the work of the
"Administrative Procedure Act § 2, 6o Stat. 237 (1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 0oos (1958).
"Hector, supra note 2, at 932-38; Board of Investigation and Research, Report on Practices and
Procedures of Government Controls, H.R. Doe. No. 678, 78th Cong., 2d Scss. 8o-83 (1944).
"
4 McFarland, Landis Report: The Voice of One Crying in the Wilderness, 47 VA. L. REv. 373, 433
(ig6x); LANDIS, op. cit. supra note 3, at i8-i9.
"'HENRY J. FRIENDLY, THE FEuDEL ADMINIS ATIVE AGENCIEs-THE NEED FOR BETTER DEFINrrION
OF 'STANDARDS r43-45 (962) [hereinafter cited as FRIENDLY]. (This is the published form of the
Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures which Judge Friendly delivered at Harvard Law School in February
x962.) Bernstein, supra note 8, at 332. See also Baker," Polc y by Rule or'Ad Hoc Approach-Which
Should It Be?, 22 LAw AND CoNvavmp. PRoB. 658, (1957). for a general comparison, of the advantages
of the two methods.
'FRIENDLY Vii.
'
71d. at 142.
"Id. at 145-47.
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agency and is likely to be the product of much unavoidable effort and thought."'
This device also avoids the usual retroactive effect of case decisions, although rules
announced in cases can be limited to future effectiveness. Formal rules, he believes,
have most of the same advantages; but in areas where specific rule-making power
has not been granted, formal rules may be susceptible to attack from courts as un-
constitutional legislation by the agencies. Agencies may also prefer statements of
policy when the principle involved is not suitable, or not ready, for the precise
articulation required in a rule.
That agencies are not limited to formal rule-making and that they may develop
rules by administrative adjudication in particular cases has been settled at least since
the Supreme Court decided the two Chenery cases.2° In the second case the Court
upheld the use by the SEC of an administrative proceeding to enunciate a new
interpretation of a provision of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of i935.2
The Court suggested, however, that since agencies, unlike courts, had formal, sub-
stantive rule-making powers, they should develop standards, to the extent possible,
through "this quasi-legislative promulgation of rules to be applied in the future."
Nevertheless, it was recognized that three reasons exist for retention by agencies of
the power to develop standards in cases: unforeseen problems may arise, the agency
may not have sufficient experience to draft a general rule, or the problem may be so
specialized that it cannot be encompassed within the terms of a general rule.23 The
Court held that the choice between developing policy by general rules or by adjudi-
catory proceedings "lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative
agency.' 24 Thus, agencies are not limited to formal rule-making; policy considera-
tions may determine the most appropriate method to be used.
DEVELOPMENT OF STANDARDS ON SELLING PRACTICES
A. Brief Background and Statutory Framework
At the outset, some points concerning the general significance of federal regula-
tion of selling practices deserve emphasis and a brief outline of the statutes may be
helpful. The federal securities acts were enacted because the common law remedies
and state criminal and blue-sky laws had proved ineffective in preventing abuses in
the sale and trading of securities. This failure resulted to a large extent from the
geographic limitations of state enforcement activities.25 However, it is clear that,
in enacting the securities laws, .Congress intended to raise the standards of conduct
of those playing important roles in the securities markets as well as to provide a
" At least one of the authors could not restrain a sigh at this impeachment, albeit mild, of the
competence and industry of agency members.
0 SEC v. Cheriery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (947); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 8o (1943).
'
1 Federal Water Service Corp., x8 S.E.C. 231 (1945).
25 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947).
:' Id. at 2o2-o3.
s' Id. at 203.
25 Loss 1o5. For a thorough discussion of the factors leading to the enactment of the federal
securities acts, see i Loss 105-28.
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national enforcement scheme. In his message to Congress accompanying the bill
which became the Securities Act of 1933, President Roosevelt said: "This proposal
adds to the ancient rule of caveat emptor, the further doctrine 'let the seller also
beware.' , The preamble to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 states that one of
its purposes is "to prevent inequitable and unfair practices" on exchanges and in the
over-the-counter markets 7 The courts have agreed that the provisions of the
statutes dealing with selling practices impose a higher standard of conduct than the
common law action of deceit which is their main antecedent.28
But Congress did not pre-empt the regulatory field 29 Thus the common law
remedies and state statutes still operate and federal regulation is only one of several
layers of control over broker-dealer conduct. In addition, controls are exercised
by the self-regulatory organizations-the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) and the stock exchanges-under wide charters such as "high standards
of commercial honor" and "just and equitable principles of trade" (NASD) and
"principles of good business practice" (New York Stock Exchange) . The pre-
occupation of the following discussion with the activities of the SEC should not be
taken to mean that the activities of the state agencies and the self-regulatory bodies
have not been important. The efforts of state securities officials, the NASD, and the
major exchanges constitute significant parts of the total regulation of the securities
industry,"' and, as more states enact the Uniform Securities Act3 and the self-
regulatory organizations strengthen their enforcement programs,33 the importance
of their activities is likely to increase. Nevertheless, regulation by the SEC, because
of the wider scope of its authority and its special powers over and relationships to
the self-regulatory bodies, has been and probably will continue to be the major
focus of control over the securities industry.
Direct Commission control over selling practices is based largely on the Securities
as S. REP. No. 47 at 6 and H.R. REP. No. 85 at 2, 73 d Cong., Ist Sess, (1933).
.1748 Stat. 881 (1934).
as 3 Loss 1435-42 and cases cited therein.
"Securities Act of 1933 § 18, 48 Star. 85 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 771 (958); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 § 28(a), 48 Stat. 903 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1958).
"Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, § x, NASD MANuL D-5; Rule 401, 2 NEw YoRK STocK EXCHANGE
GMUDE 2401. For a thorough discussion of the activities of the self-regulatory bodies and the relationship
of their activities to the Commission's, see chapter XI of the Special Study. The self-regulatory organi-
zations exercise essentially governmental powers under the Commission's oversight, and the Special
Study recommended that this system be strengthened and continued. Strangely, not much attention
has been given to this joint effort of a government agency and private bodies by scholars and critics of
the administrative process or to an evaluation of this cooperative scheme and as to possibilities of
application elsewhere. One article dealing with this subject is contained in this symposium. See
Jennings, Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry: The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
29 LAw & CoNTrmp. PRoa. 663 (x964).
1t Special Study, Pt. 4, at 501-02, 734-37-
" Seventeen states have already adopted the Uniform Securities Act in whole or substantially. BLUE
SKY L. Rap, 4901 (r963).
"S As noted in chapter XII of the Special Study, the NASD, the New York Stock Exchange, and the
American Stock Exchange have taken steps to improve their enforcement programs; their efforts in this
regard are continuing.
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Act of 1933"4 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.s The 1933 Act is primarily
directed at the public offering of new issues of securities. It adopted the disclosure
principle of the English Companies Act80 to deal with abuses in this area, that is, a
requirement of adequate and accurate written information-including a prospectus-
in all offerings subject to the statute. Supplementing this prospectus requirement,
section 17 of the 1933 Act prohibits fraudulent practices and false and misleading
written or oral statements in the offer or sale of securities. The 1934 Act is a regu-
latory statute in a more conventional sense. It extends the disclosure principle to
securities traded on the stock exchanges, prohibits specific trading practices, sets
general standards of conduct for broker-dealers, authorizes the Commission to adopt
rules governing broker-dealer conduct, and prescribes a licensing (and revocation)
procedure for broker-dealers. Finally, it provides the sell-regulatory authorities
with certain governmental powers and vests in the Commission oversight and review
responsibilities. Both acts impose civil and criminal liabilities for violations of their
provisions.
Although the Exchange Act contains specific prohibitions and precise regulatory
mandates with respect to certain broker-dealer activities, 37 the Commission's broadest
powers with respect to broker-dealer conduct are based on those provisions which
prescribe a general standard of conduct to be observed in all securities transactions.
These are found in sections io(b), 15(c) (i), and 15(c) (2), which, with some differ-
ences, prohibit the use of "manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or
contrivance." Section io(b) applies to purchases and sales by any person, and sec-
tions 15(c) (i) and 15(c)(2) apply to transactions by broker-dealers. In addition
to the general rule-making powers in both acts authorizing the Commission to adopt
rules necessary to enforcement of these acts,3" these sections vest in the Commission
specific authority to define "manipulative, deceptive, or otherwise fraudulent" devices,
contrivances, acts, and practices, and to promulgate rules designed to prevent such
activities. Under other provisions of the act, the Commission has established
reporting requirements and rules with respect to record-keeping,"' financial responsi-
bility,40 and the hypothecation of customer's securities. 41
The licensing requirement for broker-dealers in section 15 (b) of the Exchange
Act requires that all broker-dealers who engage in securities transactions by use of
ad 48 Stat. 74 (933) as amended, 15 U.S.C.M.§ 77a-aa (1958), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 55 77b-h (Supp.
IV, .1963) [hereinafter cited as Securities Act].
"48 Stat. 881 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to hh-.I (1958), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §5 78c-s
(Supp. IV, 1963) [hereinafter cited as Exchange Act).
"azi & x2 Geo. 6, c. 38, consolidating Companies Act, 1929, 19 &c 2o Geo. 5, C. 23, and Companies
Act, 1947, io & ii Geo. 6, c. 47. The 1929 Act was one of the models used for the SecuritiesAct.
'E.g., Exchange Act §S 8, 9, 1o(a) and xi.
"Securities Act 5 19(a); Exchange Act S 23(a).
"Exchange Act § 17,'and SEC Rules I7a-2 to -7, 17 C.F.R. 240.I7a-2 to -7, thereunder [hereinafter
only the SEC Rules.citations will be given for rules under the Exchange Act, since they are all in 17
C.F.R. under section 240 with tleir numbers unchanged].
*" E xch'ange Act § i5(c)(3) and Rule 15c3-k, tereunder.
"Exchange Act §§ 8(c)(I) and 15(c)(2) and Rules 8c-i and 15c2-I, thereunder.
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federal jurisdictional means42 (otherwise than on a national securities exchange),
except those doing an exclusively intrastate business, must register with the Com-
mission.43 Since most exchange member firms do some over-the-counter business,
this provision has required practically all broker-dealers doing some interstate
business to register under the act.' The Commission is empowered to deny or to
revoke registration if a broker-dealer or his salesman has wilfully violated any
provision of the 1934 Act or the 1933 Act or any rule under these statutes.45 The
effect of revocation is to prevent a broker-dealer from engaging in the securities
business as a salesman, or as a broker-dealer, without prior Commission approval.
Where it appears that a violation has occurred, the Commission has available
to it several alternatives which it can pursue singly or in combination. It may seek
an injunction against continuance of such conduct46 or a criminal conviction,47 or
it may institute an administrative proceeding as a basis for a formal determination
whether a violation has in fact occurred and whether the broker-dealer registration
should be revoked or an application for registration denied 4 The method which
the Commission uses in a particular case depends on urgency, equity,49 nature of the
alleged violations involved and a variety of other considerations.
Court decisions dealing with provisions of the securities acts, particularly the
more recent ones, have contributed significantly to the articulation of standards for
broker-dealer selling practices. However, these have not been as numerous as
Commission formal rules, administrative decisions, and statements of policy in this
area. Only summary statements of some of the decisions of the NASD and the
"Section i5(a) of the Exchange Act provides that no broker-dealer "shall make use of the mails
or of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce" to engage in securities transactions unless
he is registered under § s5 (b), which requires registration with the Commission.
"As part of its current legislative program now before the Congress, the Commission has proposed
the elimination of this intrastate exemption.
It should be noted that the fraud provisions of § 15(c) and § io(b) apply to unregistered broker-
dealers doing an exclusively intrastate business so long as the jurisdictional means are used. This
coverage is similar to that under the anti-fraud provision of the Securities Act, 5 17(a), which applies
with equal force to securities exempt from the registration requirements of that act.
" The Special Study estimated that there were more than 6,ooo broker-dealer firms in the country.
On February 28, 1962, 5,785 of these firms were registered with the Commission. Special Study, pt. I,
16.
43Exchange Act §5(h ).
"Exchange Act §21(e).
"Exchange Act § 32(a). Recommendations for criminal proceedings for violations of the securities
acts are presented by the Commission to the Department of Justice. Such proceedings are prosecuted by
the United States Attorney for the federal judicial district in which the action is to be brought.
"Exchange Act § 15(b).
"To revoke the registration of a broker-dealer, the'Commission must find that such revocation
is in the "public interest" and that the broker-dealer firm or a person affiliated with it has violated the
securities acts or committed one of the other specific acts which provide a basis for revocation of registra-
tion. Exchange Act § 55(b).
Section 19(a)(3) of the Exchange Act gives the Commission the power to suspend or expel officers
or members of exchanges for violating any provision of the 1934 Act or rule' thereunder. About 30
adjudicatory proceedings against exchange members have been brought under this section, of which about
half were also directed at the firms' registrations as over-the-counter:broker-dealers under'l is(b). See
2 Loss 1172-75.
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exchanges in disciplinary proceedings are published. 0 Consequently, standards
for selling practices have been most fully developed and articulated in Commission
materials and our discussion will concentrate on them.
B. Commission's Use of Formal Rules
It was a deliberate decision to vest in the Commission the broad rule-making
powers in regard to selling practices found in the Exchange Act 1 The bill which
became the act originally dealt very specifically with a number of practices which
had given rise to abuse. Representatives of the securities industry argued that these
provisions lacked the flexibility necessary to deal with such complicated matters
and that unforeseen developments might easily create the need for statutory revision.
Accordingly, the statute, as enacted in 1934, gave the Commission wide discretion
as to the form of rules to implement the statutory purposes in the over-the-counter
market.52 This discretion was limited by the amendments enacted in 1936, without
significantly affecting the Commission's rule-making powers over selling practices.53
By 1937 the Commission had adopted eleven rules concerned with a variety of
broker-dealer selling practices.54 These were based in part on the fair practice
rules drafted by the Investment Bankers Code Committee which had been created
under the National Industrial Recovery Act and on state blue-sky regulations.0
Thereafter, the pace slackened; through 1944 only four new rules were adopted."
The next rule was promulgated in 1954; it concerns a problem not related to fraudu-
lent conduct of the usual variety.57  In 1955, the three rules dealing with trading
in a security by a broker-dealer involved in a distribution of the same security-the
"stabilization" problem-were made effective.58 During the late '5os and early '6os
the Commission was concerned with the problems arising from the rapidly in-
creasing number of offerings of securities which took place during the "new issue"
boom and the unethical selling practices engaged in by some broker-dealers during
this period. There was a renewal of rule-making activity in 1962 when three rules
dealing with different selling practices were promulgated "9 and the "boiler room"
"The New York Stock Exchange and the NASD publish only the penalties and brief descriptions of
the offenses in those disciplinary actions which involve serious violations. Speial StUdy, pt. 4, 540,
667. The Special Study recommended that the disciplinary actions and underlying decisions of the New
York Stock Exchange and the NASD be given greater publicity. If this recommendation is followed, these
decisions will undoubtedly play a greater role in the development of standards as to selling practices.
"
1 See H.R. REp. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (I934).
"= The Exchange Act originally granted the Commission the power to enact any rules for the over-
the-counter markets which it found to be in the public interest and necessary to accord investors pro.
tections comparable to those afforded in the exchange markets. 48 Stat. 895-96 ('934).
Salle provision referred to in note 52 was repealed and Congress established the registration and
revocation provisions for broker-dealers (§ i5(b)), a general standard of conduct (§ x(c)(1)) with a
specific grant of rule-making power, and certain other provisions. 49 Stat. 1375 (1936).
"'Rules rob-i to -3, x5C1-i to -8.
-3 Loss 1425.
o Rules 15cx-9 (1938), 15c2-I (194r), iob-5 (1942), and 15c2-2 (1944).
' Rule 15c2-3.
" Rules iob-6, xob-7, and iob-8.
11 Rules xob-9, 15c2-4, and 15C2-5.
BROKER-DEALER SELLING PRACTICE STANDARDS
rule, discussed below, was proposed.6 ° The Commission has since been occupied
to a great extent with implementation of the Report of the Special Study"' and
preparation of its legislative program which is currently before Congress.62
To recapitulate, there are now twenty-two rules under sections io(b), 15(c) (i)
and I(c) (2). With the exception of rules 15cI-I (which defines terms used in the
other rules) and 15c2-I (which deals with the hypothecation of over-the-counter
securities), they are all concerned with various selling practices. They do not
purport to cover the whole range of sales activities. They deal with several types of
abuses, use different solutions and range greatly in specificity. The Commission
has not sought to develop a group of rules to comprehend all, or even most, fraudu-
lent practices; the gaps in the rules alone suggest the difficulty of such a task were it
attempted.
Two of the rules prescribe a general standard of conduct which is no more
specific than that found in the statute. Rules Iob-5 and 15ci-2 are modeled on the
general anti-fraud provision of section i7(a) of the Securities Act and make clear
that the basic prohibitions against fraudulent practices apply to purchases and sales
both by professional broker-dealers and by any other persons, and to over-the-counter
as well as stock exchange transactions.0 3 In furtherance of this general aim, Rule
iob-i makes the anti-manipulative provisions of section 9, which relate to securities
registered for trading on exchanges, applicable to securities traded on exchanges but
exempt from registration.
6 4
Some rules are intended either to prohibit certain fraudulent representations or
to establish requirements for the use of representations which would otherwise be
misleading. Rule 15cI-3 makes it unlawful for a broker-dealer to represent that
registration with the Commission indicates that the Commission has approved his
business or any securities transaction which he effects. Recently promulgated rule
iob-9 prohibits the representation that a distribution of securities is being made on an
"all-or-none" basis unless one of the conditions of the offering is that all or part
of the purchaser's consideration will be returned in the event that all of the securities
being offered are not sold at a specified price within a limited period of time and the
total amount due the seller is not received by him by a specified date. One rule deals
specifically with representations in financial statements; rule i5ci-9 requires that there
be clearly set forth the assumptions upon which a pro-forma financial statement pur-
"oProposed Rule x5c2-6, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6885 (Aug. 16, 1962).
6 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7290 (April 9, 9 6o); N.Y. Times, March 6, 1964, p.
47, cots. 6-8; SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7218 (Jan. 9, 1964); SEC Rule [7a-8. Proposed
Rule 15c2-7 which relates to over-the-counter quotations, if enacted, will be the first rule under the anti-
fraud provisions resulting from the work of the Special Study. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 7275 (March 24, 1964).
" S. x642, H.R. 6789, and H.R. 6793, 88th Cong., ist Sess. (1963).
"'Section io(b), unlike §§ 5(c)(i) and 15(c)(2), is not self-executing, and therefore Rule iob-5
was necessary to impose the general prohibition in the statute on all purchases and sales.
"4 Rule xob-3 provides that it is unlawful for any broker or dealer, indirectly or directly by the
jurisdictional means, to engage in any practices prohibited under § 15(c), as defined by the Commission.
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porting to give effect to the receipts from a public offering of securities is based.6"
In various rules, the Commission has utilized the disclosure principle, which the
statutes apply to securities offered publicly or listed on exchanges. Rule i5c1-4 sets
out in detail the minimum information concerning every securities transaction to be
included in the written confirmation which must be sent to the customer. The
required information includes the capacity in which the broker-dealer is acting,
whether as a broker or as principal for his own account, and, if as a broker, his com-
mission or other remuneration and the name of the other party to the transaction or
an offer to disclose it upon request.6" Other rules require disclosure of any control
relationship between the broker-dealer and the issuer of the security involved in the
transactions"7 and of any financial interest of the broker-dealer in the distribution
of the security.68
Rule 15c2-5, which deals with the complicated problem of "equity funding," is
an interesting example of a rule that goes beyond the prohibition or disclosure
devices used in other rules. Equity funding, which is also known as "secured fund-
ing" or "life funding," is the practice of purchasing securities, typically mutual fund
shares, and then pledging the securities as collateral for loans the proceeds of which
are used to pay the premiums on insurance policies purchased at about the same
time. The purchaser often obtains the original funds for such transactions by liqui-
dating or borrowing upon his previously acquired life insurance policy. The Com-
mission learned that investment programs of this kind were being offered to persons
whether or not such programs were appropriate for them and without adequate
disclosures of the costs, risks and obligations involved 9 The rule compels written
disclosures of certain important facts involved in such transactions; and it requires
the broker-dealer to obtain information as to the financial situation of the investor so
that a determination can be reached whether the transaction as a whole is suitable for
him and a written statement can be furnished to him setting forth the basis for this
determination. This rule, like certain other rules developed under the anti-fraud
provisions, is an example of the use of the rule-making power to articulate a detailed
regulatory scheme for a new problem which probably could not have been developed
as quickly by the ad hoc approach of administrative or judicial proceedings, which
depends upon the building of a record in a particular case. It should be noted,
however, that a court recently found that an insurance agent had committed common
law fraud by persuading the plaintiff to enter into a complicated bank-financed
insurance plan which was clearly not suitable for him.7 °
See also Rules x5c1-3 and i5ci-8.
6 The Special Study recommended that current disclosure requirements, including those made
on confirmations, be improved to provide additional information in particular types of transactions.
Special Study, pt. 2, at 677-78.
67 Rule 1c1-5.-
OR Rule 15CI-6.
" SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6 8 o9,,at r (May 22, 196a).
7 Anderson v. Knox, 297 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 196z), affisrning Knox v..Andersqn, 159 F, Supp. 795
(D. Hawaii, 1958), x62 F. Supp. 338 (D. Hawaii, x958).
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Although formal rules make possible detailed regulation, difficult problems are
frequently encountered in attempting to deal in this way with the complex financial
practices involved in the distribution and trading of securities. A good illustration
is presented by the Commission's stabilization rules. These rules were promulgated
partly as a result of congressional dissatisfaction with the operation of the informal
procedures which had been used.71 Prior to adoption, they were given thorough
consideration over a substantial period of time by members of the securities industry
and the Commission. Nevertheless, the Commission found it necessary to allow
for flexibility in their administration by including general exemption clauses
within the rules to deal with practices which would not have an adverse effect on
investors but technically were within the prohibitions of the rules. It was also neces-
sary to state, when the rules were made effective, that because particular practices
were not prohibited under the provisions of the rules did not mean they could not
be found unlawful under the statute or other rules.72 The rules were based on con-
siderable prior administrative experience and their meaning has been explained in
innumerable informal conferences since they became effective. Nevertheless, the
Special Study recently indicated that one of them, rule iob-6, which the Commission
has interpreted in several cases,73 was subject to misunderstanding and in need of
further clarification. 74
Several rules dealing with various selling practices are not subject to generaliza-
tion. These include rules concerning the payment of special compensation to induce
a third person to buy a security by a dealer interested in a distribution of the
security,75 prohibiting "churning" of discretionary accounts,70 and rules which make
it unlawful to engage in over-the-counter transactions in securities when the Com-
mission has suspended trading in that security on the exchanges77 or to trade in
pre-war German securities unless such securities have been validated by the
authority established for that purpose.7 "
Despite these differences among the various rules, they do have certain similarities.
Most of them declare specific acts or practices fraudulent within the meaning and
prohibitions of the statutes.79 Since they substantially implement a statutory policy
and are issued pursuant to a statutory grant of specific rule-making power, courts,
theoretically at least, should give them the deference accorded legislative pronounce-
73 Loss 1581-82.
, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5194, at 3 (July 5, 1955).
c Theodore A. Landau, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6792, at 5-6 (April 30, 1962); Bruns,
Nordeman & Co., 40 S.E.C. 652, 659-61 (796i). See also SEC v. Scott, Taylor, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 904
(1959).
7
" Special Study, pt. x, at 559. For a detailed discussion of problems under this rule see Whitney,
Rule zob-6: The Special Study's Rediscovered Rule, 62 Mixc. L. Rav. 567 (1964).
• Rule iob-2.
Rule 15c'-7.
'€ Rule I5C2-2.
78 Rule 15C2-3.
T 0Exceptions to this definitional approach arm Rules iob-2, zob-3 and Iob-5.
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ments s° Few of the rules constitute outright prohibitions of specific practices;
rather they permit certain acts so long as the safeguards in the rule are met. Thus,
the Commission has recognized that many practices in the securities industry which
have been and can be used for improper purposes may also be carried on in accord-
ance with high ethical standards!'
C. Commission Use of Adjudication
Since the Exchange Act was enacted thirty years ago, many administrative
proceedings have been concerned with broker-dealer selling practices. Although
proceedings often are based on injunctions granted by the courts or involve stipula-
tions in which the respondent broker-dealers agree to findings of violations and to
revocation or some other sanction, many of them have been strongly contested.
These proceedings, particularly the contested ones, have provided opportunities for
the development of standards and rules under the statutory prohibitions. The Com-
mission's approach to them is based on the view, endorsed by the courts, that the
obligations imposed by the anti-fraud provisions of the securities acts are not limited
to those recognized in conventional common law fraud doctrines.8 2 Under this
approach, the anti-fraud provisions not only prohibit gross frauds such as mis-
appropriation of funds and outright falsehoods, but also those acts that violate the
obligation of fair dealing which the Congress believed was required of professional
broker-dealers and their salesmen because of the very nature of the securities business.
As a result, the decisions in the administrative proceedings have articulated general
theories and rules as to specific practices which establish a high standard of conduct
for broker-dealers in their relations with customers. As discussed below, the courts
generally have sustained these interpretations of the meaning and intent of the
anti-fraud provisions.
Commission decisions as to the obligations of broker-dealers to their customers
are usually rationalized as falling within two theories. These are known as the
"shingle" or "implied representation" theory and the "fiduciary" or "trust and
confidence" theory." Both emphasize the intricate nature of the merchandise
involved and the need for protection of the average investor from sharp practices
by the usually more sophisticated broker-dealer. The first theory, which is the
broader of the two, holds that merely by hanging up his shingle, i.e., doing business
so0 DAvis 299. A large amount of legal scholarship has been expended on the distinction between
"interpretative" and "legislative" rules. id. §§ 5.03 and 5.04. Without attempting to analyze the decisions
of the courts with respect to this distinction, it is believed, as suggested in the text, that the Com-
mission's anti-fraud rules fall within the "legislative" category.
See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1934).
82B. Fennekohl & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6898, at 6 (Sept. x8, 1962); Cady,
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 910 (1961). See Norris & Hirshberg v. SEC, 177 F.2d 228, 233 (D.C. Cir.
1949); Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786
(1944).
"See 3 Loss 1482-15o8. Also see Comment, 62 MIcH. L. REv. 730, 734-35 (1964); Ioomis, The
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of Z940, 28 GEo. WAsH. L. Rzv. 214,
240 (1959).
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with the public, the broker-dealer impliedly represents that he will deal fairly with
his customers in accordance with the standards of the profession8 4  It might be
argued that, since the shingle theory is couched in terms of an implied representation,
disclosure by the broker-dealer of the nature of the questioned conduct and its in-
consistency with accepted standards, would prevent the conduct from constituting
a violation of the anti-fraud provisions. However, the non-disclosure of the un-
ethical conduct does not appear to be the controlling factor in this area. A broker-
dealer is not likely to disclose to his customer that he is engaging in conduct which
falls short of meeting general standards of fairness, and, therefore, such a disclosure is
rarely asserted as a defense to charges of misconduct-although alleged sophistication
or awareness by the customer is. However, apart from the question of what factual
proof would be deemed sufficient to establish that adequate and meaningful dis-
closure was made in a situation where the customer was dealt with on the basis of
lesser standards of fairness, the Commission has indicated in some cases that the
proscribed fraudulent conduct would not be cured by such disclosure.s
The second theory was articulated in cases involving situations in which the
broker-dealer had placed himself in a special position of trust and confidence with
the customer."" This theory is that in such a situation a broker-dealer owes the
customer the fiduciary's duties to disclose the nature and extent of any interest he may
have in the transactions and to act in the customer's best interests.8 7  And he is not
relieved of this duty because he has executed the transaction as a dealer for his own
account rather than as broker for the customer 8
Although referred to as separate doctrines, these theories are, in fact, closely
connected. They developed at approximately the same time in cases in which the
Commission pointed out that the duty of securities dealers to treat their customers
fairly resulted from holding themselves out as possessing specialized knowledge
and skill and from cultivation of their customers' trust and confidence.8 9 These
theories can be viewed as different ways of characterizing the obligation imposed
",E.g., Mac Robbins & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6846, at 3 (July x, 1962); Carl
J. Bliedung, 38 S.E.C. 518, 521 (1958); E. H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 18 S.E.C. 347, 362 (1945).
"'Mac Robbins & Co., supra note 84, at 4 n.15; Powell & McGowan, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 7302, at 2 (April 24, 1964).
8 E.g., Haley & Co., 37 S.E.C. 1oo, io6 (z956); Arleen W. Hughes, 27 S.E.C. 629, 638 (1948);
Norris & Hirshberg, Inc., 21 S.E.C. 865, 882-83 (1946).
"'Looper & Co., 38 S.E.C. 294, 300 (X958); Arleen W. Hughes, supra note 86, at 636 (948).
' Herbert R. May, 27 S.E.C. 8r3, 829-30 (1948); Allender Co., 9 S.E.C. 1043, 1053-54 (1941).
It is interesting to note that English brokers seem to consider that the "trust and confidence" theory
applies to all of their relationships with their customers. The London Stock Exchange forbids advertising
by member firms. In consequence, the back cover of each issue of The Stock Exchange Journal of the
London Stock Exchange contains the following legend: "As the relationship between Stockbroker and
Client is one ol mutual trust and confidence, the Council of the Stock Exchange consider that the best
way for a member of the public to get into touch with a Broker is by personal introduction." [Emphasis
supplied.] The exchange offers to provide interested persons with lists of member firms.
"' Allender Co., supra note 88, at 1053-57; Jansen & Co., 6 S.E.C. 391, 394 ('939); Duker & Duker, 6
S.E.C. 386, 388-89 (1939). See Loss, The SEC and the Broker-Dealer, x VAND. L. Rav. 516, 527 (1948).
Also see xo S.E.C. ANN. REP. 74 (1944).
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upon all broker-dealers by the statutory provisions in varying contexts. Recent
Commission decisions have tended to rely upon, and to articulate more fully, the
obligations which the shingle theory imposes on broker-dealers, and to emphasize
the obligations which broker-dealers owe to all customers regardless of the existence
of any special reliance or dependence. 0
Under the general theories which rationalize this approach, Commission de-
cisions have developed rules on specific practices which, like the rules promulgated
under the formal rule-making power, vary greatly in their scope. The case rule
with the widest application, and the first one which the Commission derived from
the shingle theory, relates to the prices charged or paid public customers by broker-
dealers. In an early case, the Commission held that a broker-dealer impliedly repre-
sents that the prices he charges his customer will bear a reasonable relationship to
the current market price of the securityY' If the prices charged are not so related
to the market price and the broker-dealer does not adequately disclose that fact, he
has failed to meet the terms of his implied representation and has violated the
anti-fraud provisions. 2 The reasonableness of the relationship to the current market
is tested by the mark-up over the prevailing wholesale market price for the security
without regard to the actual cost of the security to the broker-dealer except insofar
as that is indicative of the current market price. 3  The rule does not limit the
broker-dealer's profit on securities which he purchased earlier at prices below
the current market price and has kept in his inventory. In a number of cases the
Commission has elaborated on the rule,94 but no attempt has been made to define
what is a reasonable spread in relation to the current market in all cases. The
NASD, under its own rule that prices be "fair, taking into consideration all relevant
circumstances,"" has suggested that, in most cases, a mark-up of five per cent or less
will not be considered unreasonable. 6
Other selling practice rules of wide applicability developed through adjudication
concern representations, disclosures, manipulation and the duty of supervision.
The anti-fraud provisions expressly prohibit false and misleading statements of a
material nature. The Commission has held that these provisions prohibit statements
made without adequate basisr even though the person making them may believe
"OE.g., Aircraft Dynamics International Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7113, at 5
(Aug. 8, 1963); Heft, Kahn & Infante, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 702o, at 4 (Fcb.
1I, 1963); Mac Robbins, supra note 84; W. T. Anderson Co., 39 S.E.C. 630, 636 (sg6o); Batkin
& CO., 38 S.E.C. 436, 446 (x958). The Commission's decision in J. Logan & Co., SEC Securities Ex.
change Act Release No. 6848, at 1o (July 9, 1962), decided just before the Mac Robbins ease, is a recent
-example of a decision which is primarily based on the shingle theory, but which also emphasizes the
customer's trust and confidence in the broker. See also Powell & McGowan, Inc., supra note 85.
:1 Duker & Duker, supra note 89.
2 Ibid.
03G. Alex Hope, 7 S.E.C. X082, 1084 (1940).
"See 3 Loss 1488
"Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, S 4, NASD MANuAL D-6.
"NASD MA uAL G-3.
'
T E.g., Barnett & Co., 40 S.E.C. 521 (1961); Leonard Burton Corp., 39 S.E.C. 211 (1959).
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them."' Thus broker-dealers have a duty of investigation. 9  This rule applies to
statements in the form of opinions as well as statements of fact,' 0 and, in the case
of predictions, it is immaterial that they ultimately prove correct if the person
making them had no basis on which to make them at the time.'0 The Com-
mission has also stated that the concept of "puffing" can have little application in the
securities industry.0 2 The Commission has spelled out what disclosures the broker-
dealer must make when he has established a relationship of trust; these include
disclosure of the cost of the security and its current market price where that is better
than the price charged, as well as the capacity in which he is acting 0 3 In addition,
as a fiduciary, he has a duty to disclose any interest he may have in the transaction
adverse to that of his customer.'0 4 In the area of manipulation, the Commission has,
in its opinions, made clear that the standards are uniformly applicable to all broker-
dealers. In section 9 of the Exchange Act, Congress expressly prohibited exchange
transactions creating trading in a security or affecting its price for the purpose of
inducing transactions by others and certain other manipulative practices, such as
wash sales and matched orders. The Commission has made clear that these anti-
manipulative provisions also apply to over-the-counter transactions' °5 The securities
acts contain no provision specifically requiring a broker-dealer to supervise the
conduct of his salesmen. After a period of development, the Commission has
established the case rule that a broker-dealer violates the anti-fraud provisions when
his employees engage in misconduct which violates the provisions and the broker-
dealer did not properly perform his duty to prevent such misconduct.'
Other case rules, like certain formal rules, deal only with a particular unethical
practice not involved in a broad range of broker-dealer activity. Examples of these
are decisions that hold it to be a fraudulent practice to effect unauthorized trans-
actions,' 07 without proper disclosure to fail to consummate transactions and to deliver
securities promptly,' and to sell securities subject to a lien'0 9 or to accept customers'
funds while insolvent." 0 An interesting example of a case rule closely related to a
formal rule is that which applies the ban against excessive trading in discretionary
o Alexander Reid & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6727, at 5 (Feb. 8, z962).
o' See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6721, at 3 (Feb. 2, 1962) (statement of policy).
Cf. Standard Bond & Share CO., 34 S.E.C. 208 (1952).0
o Ross Securities, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7069, at 5 (April 30, 1963).
2l Heft, Kahn & Infante, Inc., supra note 9o.
'2 B. Fennekohl & Co., supra note 82, at 5-6 (Sept. 18, 1962).10 3 Arleen W. Hughes, supra note 86, at 637.
10. Ramey Kelly Corp., 39 S.E.C. 756, 761 (96o); Mason, Moran & Co., 35 S.E.C. 84, 90 (953).
'
5 Barrett & Co., 9 S.E.C. 319, 328 (194x). See 3 Loss 1563-68.
10 Sutro Bros. & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7052, at i5-i9 (April io, 1963);
Reynolds & CO., 39 S.E.C. 902, 916-I7 (ig6o). The amendments to the securities acts currently being.
considered by Congress make failure to supervise a statutory basis for revocation.
7
First Anchorage Corp., 34 S.E.C. 299, 304 (1952).
... E.g., Carl J. Bliedung, 38 S.E.C. 518, 521 (1958); Lewis H. Ankeny, 29 S.E.C. 514, 5x6 (1949).
See also SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6778 (April i6, 1962) (statement of policy).
""' Richard A. Sebastian, 38 S.E.C. 865, 868 (1959).
""0E.g., Batkin & CO., 38 S.E.C. 436, 446 (1958); W. F. Colly & CO., 31 S.E.C. 722, 726 (195o).
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authority accounts found in rule i5Ci-7 to accounts controlled by the broker-dealer
because of the customer's reliance on his recommendations 1
One group of recent case rules deals with a problem, that of boiler-room opera-
tions, with which the Commission has attempted to deal by a formal rule. While
all of the characteristics are not found in each case and boiler rooms take various
forms, the term is generally used to describe a broker-dealer firm which typically sells
low-priced, speculative and obscure securities over the long-distance telephone to
customers who are unknown to the salesman, through intensive, "high-pressure"
selling methods, including misrepresentation. 12 The unethical methods used pro-
vide a basis for proceeding against these broker-dealers under the general anti-fraud
provisions of the statutes and that is the course which the Commission has followed.
However, much damage often has been done to public investors before the evidence
of such'violations is accumulated and presented to the courts or to the Commission
in administrative proceedings."' Moreover, there are substantial problems in
obtaining the witnesses, scattered throughout the country, and in proving fraudulent
representations made over the telephone. Boiler-room operations seemed to become
more prevalent in the recent bull market and the prosecution of such cases placed
a heavy burden on the Commission's enforcement staff. In 1962 the Commission
proposed rule 15c2-6, which, subject to certain exemptions, would make it unlawful
for a broker-dealer to offer or sell by telephone equity securities at a price of $Io or
less to persons other than regular customers. 14 The proposed rule would establish
record-keeping requirements for such transactions to facilitate a determination
whether the securities or transactions are exempt from its prohibitions. It has beern
objected to strongly by the securities industry primarily on the grounds that it is
too sweeping in coverage, since most securities firms sell low-priced stock over the
telephone, and that the extensive record-keeping requirements place too heavy a bur-
den on ethical broker-dealers as a price for detecting those who are not."' The Com-
mission has as yet taken no final action with respect to the proposed rule.
Since the rule was proposed, however, the Commission issued a number. of
decisions which have dealt very specifically with boiler-room operations. The
second Mac Robbins decision, discussed further below, emphasized that a salesman
in a boiler room could not rely, without further investigation, on the information
... Looper & Co., 38 S.E.C. 294, 300-o (1958); R. H. Johnson & Co., 36 S.E.C. 467, 485 (x955),
afl'd sub nom., R. H. Johnson & Co. v. SEC, 231 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir. 5956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 844
(1956)..
... See Special Study, pt. i, at 265-68. The boiler room is not a new or uniquely American phe-
nomenon. The term was used in a judicial decision as early as 1937. United States v. Rollnick, 91 F.2d
911, 915 (2d Cir. 1937). Similar broker-dealer activities in England led to a Board of Trade report on
"Share-Pushing," CmD. No. 5539 (1937), which resulted in the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act,
1939, 2 & 3 Geo. 6, c. 16, revised by Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, C. 45.
... It has been asserted that one large boiler-room operator sold over $20 million in securities before
being convicted of fraud and sentenced to a prison term. Special Study, pt. X, at 266.
" SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6885 (Aug. z6, 1962).
l For a discussion of the issues involved, see Comment, 72 YALn L.J. 1411 (x963).
BROKER-DEALER SELLING PRACTCE STANDARDS 707
furnished by his employer as a basis for representations to his customers.1 16 In other
cases, the Commission held that a research analyst who prepared a fraudulent
"market letter" on the instructions of his employer was a "cause" of the revocation
of his employer's broker-dealer registration 17 and that a salesman in a boiler-room
operation who knowingly turned a customer over to a "dynamiter," the ultimate
persuader of the customer, bore the responsibility for the fraudulent and misleading
statements made by him."' In these and other cases," 9 the Commission has stressed
the idea that boiler-room operations are designed to induce a hasty decision by the
customer and that no effort is made by the salesman, or opportunity provided to his
customer, to determine whether the security recommended is suitable for the
customer to whom it is recommended. These cases seem to suggest the rule, not yet
expressly stated, that a practice of recommending speculative securities indiscrim-
inately on the telephone to unknown persons in an intensive sales campaign-the
usual characteristics of a boiler room-constitutes a course of conduct which is
prohibited under the anti-fraud provisions and is a basis for revocation. 20 Such a
principle would achieve many of the aims of proposed Rule i5c2-6, without creating
some of the problems raised by the proposed rule.
In any consideration of the standards which the Commission has developed by
adjudication, the Commission's influence on the self-regulatory organizations must
be considered. The Commission has certain powers to abrogate and supplement
the rules of the self-regulatory organizations.' 2 Despite the existence of these powers,
the Commission generally has followed the practice of consulting informally on
rule changes or proposed new rules, rather than taking formal administrative
action.' 2 The Commission's views as to fair dealing and standards of sales practices
have been reflected, at least in part, in the rules, interpretations and statements of
policy of the self-regulatory institutions.1- The statute vests in the Commission
specific review authority only with respect to NASD disciplinary proceedings.
23
Nevertheless, the Commission has used this power much the way courts perform
such a function in reviewing administrative agency actions, and it has proved to be
a fruitful source for Commission opinions discussing sales practices within the
concepts of "high standards of commercial honor" and "just and equitable principles
of trade."'24
""Mac Robbins & Co., supra note 84, at 12.
11? Heft, Kahn & Infante, Inc., supra note go.
"' Ross Securities, Inc., supra note zoo.
'
1
oJ. Logan & Co., supra note go; Best Securities, Inc., 39 S.E.C. 931 (ig6o).
The Special Study recommended further implementation of the concept of suitability as a standard
for all broker-dealer firms. Special Study, pt. I, at 329.
221Exchange Act §§ 15A(k)(i) and (2), and i9(b).
22 Special Study, pt. 4, at 7r-17.
212 See, e.g., Rules of Fair Practice and Interpretations, Policies, and Explanations, NASD MANUAL;
Rules 401-11 and supplementary material thereto, 2 NEw YoRx STocic ExcHANGE GuDE 2401-11.70;
Rules 410-22, AmIEMCAN STociK EXCHANGE GUIDE 9430-42.
"'Exchange Act § i5A(g). See also Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (x963).
1"I Rules of Fair Practice, art. nI, § I, NASD MANUAL D-5 .
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The NASD generally has attempted to apply a "businessman's approach" in its
disciplinary proceedings and the decisions of its Board of Governors usually have
not contained extended discussions of the principles applied. 125  On review, the
Commission has often elaborated on the finer points involved in the case and dis-
cussed the general meaning of the particular selling practice rule involved. Com-
mission decisions have been particularly important in the development of the NASD
standards on fair prices under the "five per cent policy" mentioned above,1 20 the
NASD rule concerning suitability of recommendations, 27 the policy against "free-
riding" or withholding of securities by a broker-dealer involved in a distribution of
those securities, 128 the duty of broker-dealers to investigate the backgrounds of their
salesmen before hiring them,129 and the duty of a broker-dealer to supervise his
salesmen."' The Commission's decisions on review of NASD actions have an
important effect not only because they publicize and rationalize NASD interpreta-
tions of its own selling practice standards but because most broker-dealers, including
exchange members, are members of the NASD"' and thus subject to enforcement
action by that organization."
D. Commission's Use of Statements of Policy
Throughout its history, the Commission has issued statements of policy to an-
nounce its position on various problems. Published as releases under the particular
acts to which they relate, they are in the form of discussions by the Commission or
expressions of opinion by a high staff official. In recent years, the Commission
has also followed the policy of elaborating more fully on the purpose or application
of a new rule in the releases proposing it or declaring it effective. In relative terms
the number of published policy statements is small when compared with the informal
administrative interpretations which are furnished to interested persons or their
counsel by letter or over the telephone' 3 These interpretations are made by staff
members, but often, when they involve an important policy matter or a close
12 Special Study, pt. 4, 664-65.
s.a General Investing Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7316 (May 15, x964); Naftalin
& Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7220 (Jan. io, 1964); Boren & Co., 40 S.E.C. 237
(196o).
-
1 First Securities Corp., 40 S.E.C. 589 (196i); Gerald M. Greenberg, 40 S.E.C. 133, 137-38 (196o).
1 28 L. H. Rothchild & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7182 (Dec. 3, x963); First
California Company, 40 S..C. 768 (ig6i).
..
9 Vickers, Christy & Co., SEC Security Exchange Act Release No. 6872 (Aug. 8, 3962).
'"First Securities Corp., 40 S.E.C. 589 (196i).13 1SpeciaJ Study, pt. 1, 16.
'" As proposed by the Commission and enacted by the Senate, the amendments to the securities acts
currently before the Congress would require all broker-dealers registered with the Commission to be
members of the NASD. S. 1642, 88th Cong., ist Sess. (3963). The amendments recommended to
the House of Representatives by its Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, however, do not
require NASD membership for all registered broker-dealers, but give the Commission the power to
exercise functions similar to the NASD with respect to nonmember broker-dealers. H.R. 6793, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. (r964). Whichever formula is finally adopted, the importance of the Commission's
appellate function over NASD disciplinary proceedings is likely to increase.
" See 3 Loss 1894-97.
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decision, they are first cleared with the Commission. These informal interpretations
deal with matters arising under all the statutes administered by the Commission and
usually take the form of statements that the staff will recommend that the Com-
mission take "no action," assuming that the facts are true as stated, or, when appro-
priate, that compliance with the pertinent statute or rule is required. Because of
problems involved in determining all the relevant facts, the intent of the parties,
and the ultimate purpose of the transaction, as a matter of policy, the Commission
and its staff are reluctant to express a view whether proposed transactions violate
the and-fraud provisions.' 4
In the selling practice area, the publication of general policy statements has
assisted the Commission in the development of standards. Early examples are
releases pointing out how trading activities of broker-dealers involved in a distribu-
tion of securities, which raise the price of that security, may violate the anti-manipula-
tive provisions of both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act,lan and how broad
"hedge clauses" in broker-dealer sales literature may violate the anti-fraud pro-
visions.13 6 More recently, a release pointing out the abuses in "hot issue" distribu-
tions137 preceded an NASD interpretation prohibiting the practice of "free-riding"' 8
and special NASD enforcement action thereunder.
The statement setting out the most specific guide-lines on selling practices relates
to literature used in the offer and sale of investment company securitiesO'39 The
statement was published as a release under the Securities Act and Investment Com-
pany Act of i94o, but actions contravening its provisions may also constitute a viola-
tion of the anti-fraud provisions of the Exchange Act. It sets out in detail the
types of representations and omissions which will be considered materially mis-
leading in investment company sales literature, prescribes the kinds of performance
charts and tables which can be used in such literature, and gives examples of the
permissible charts and tables. The NASD has established a procedure for reviewing
sales literature before its use by members to make sure that it complies with the
statement.
40
Some statements have been used primarily as warning devices, pointing out how
established policies apply to a particular problem, although they may also serve to
develop these policies further. Examples are the statement which sets out in detail
the responsibilities of broker-dealers when distributing securities which have not
."A notable exception to this policy relates to the giving of interpretations whether proposed
activities in connection with securities distributions will violate the stabilizaton rules.
"'SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3505 (Nov. 16, 1943).
"" SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4593 (April 1o, 1951).
...SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6o97 (Oct. 23, 1959).
"" NASD MANUAL G-23-26.
... SEC Securities Act Release No. 3856 (Oct. 31, 1957) and accompanying Statement of Policy.
The statement was first issued in 1950, SEC Securities Act Release No. 3385 (Aug. 14, 195 o ) and has
been revised twice since then, in 1956, SEC Securities Act Release No. 3669 (Aug. 9, 1956) and in 1957,
SEC Securities Act Release No. 3856, supra.
1.0 See Boren & Co., 40 S.E.C. 217, 223 (196o).
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been registered under the Securities Act,' 41 and the one pointing out the dangers
in too glowing statements about a certain foreign stock when it first became available
in the United States and financial data concerning the issuer was not available.142
. The self-regulatory organizations make substantial use of the statement of policy
device. The NASD and the exchanges have published many formal interpretations
of their rules which are incorporated into the official collections of their constitutions,
by-laws and rules.'" Concerning selling practices, the New York Stock Exchange
has just published a complete revision of its rules and interpretations concerning
advertising, research reports, and sales literature used by broker-dealers' and a
new interpretation of its supervision rule,'44a and the NASD is currently revising
its rules and interpretations in both of these areas.
E. Court Reaction to Commission Selling Practice Rules and Standards
As suggested earlier, Commission materials have provided the main source of
published statements as to the standards applicable to broker-dealer selling practices
since the passage of the securities acts. There have not been many court decisions
expounding upon the express civil liability provisions of the acts.' 4' A large body
of law has developed as a result of court decisions which have implied a civil liability
for violation of section io(b) of the Exchange Act and rule iob5 thereunder,1" but
these cases generally have not involved broker-dealer selling practices. For these
reasons the significant court decisions in this area generally have been in cases
involving some sort of Commission action, that is, criminal cases in which the
Commission assists the Department of Justice, 47 Commission requests for injunc-
tions, 4 ' and appeals from Commission administrative action.' The court decisions
"' SEC Securities Act Release No. 4445 and SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6721 (Feb.
2, 1962).
... SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6525 (April X2, r961). Another example of such
a statement of policy is that which warned that it was a violation of the implied representation of fair
dealing for a broker-dealer to delay delivery of securities purchased by a customer unless he previously
disclosed his intent to do this. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6778 (April x6, x962).
"'NASD MaNuAL; Naw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE GUIDE; AMERICAN STOCK EXCIANGE GUIDE.
14' 2 NEW YoRm STOCK EXCHANGE GunE 2471-74A.
""New York Stock Exchange, Member Firm Educational Circular No. i89, May I, x964.
'" Securities Act §§ xI and x2; Exchange Act §§ 9(e) and i8(a). See 3 Loss. 1682.92, 1746-47.
The statement" in the text does not apply to the special civil liability for short-term trading by corporate
"insiders" imposed in § 16(b), which has given rise to much litigation. See 2 Loss 1040-90. A recent
example of a case under the express civil liability provisions that did involve selling practices is Herring
v. Hendison, 218 F. Supp. 49 (S.D.N.Y. x963).
4'"See 3 Loss 1757-97.
" E.g., United States v. Dardi, 4 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 91,342 (2d Cir., Mar. x7, 1964); United
States v. Benjamin, 4 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 91,329 (2d Cir., Feb. 17, 1964); and United States
v. Ross, 321 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. x963).
"' E.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. I8o (1963); SEC v. F. S. Johns & Co.,
207 F. Supp. 566 (D. N.J. x962).
219 E.g., Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. x963); R. H. Johnson & Co. v. SEC, 231 F.2d 523
(D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 844 (1956).
Court decisions up to Dec.'31, 1948 involving all of the statutes administered by, the Commission
are collected in Securities and Exchange Commission Judicial Decisions, Vols. x-5 , Published by the
Government Printing Office. The Commission's staff is currently bringing this collection up to date, and
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have generally supported the selling practice standards enunciated by the Com-
mission, 50 and some have added significantly to them.151
More decisions on selling practices seem to have arisen in cases involving court
review of action by the Commission denying or revoking a broker-dealer registra-
tion. Courts of appeals have upheld Commission decisions articulated under the
shingle theory and the fiduciary theory. In the early case of Charles Hughes & Co.
v. SEC" 2 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed a revocation case
based upon a finding that the broker-dealer had charged prices unrelated to the
current market without disclosing that fact. The court noted that it did not have
to determine whether common law fraud had been established. It stated that "the
essential objective of securities legislation is to protect those who do not .know
market conditions from those who do.'- 53  The court agreed with the Commission
that the charging of excessive prices without disclosing that fact constituted a viola-
tion of the anti-fraud provisions. One of the first Commission decisions in which it
clearly applied the fiduciary theory, Arleen W. Hughes,54 was subsequently upheld
on review by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.' 5
In that case, the court stated that the securities industry "by its nature, requires
specialized and unique legal treatment." Other decisions by the courts of appeals
have recognized that the public needs special protection in the securities industry
because of the ever-present opportunities for dishonesty and the fact that fraudulent
activities may assume subtle and involved forms' 55
Despite the number of opinions by lower federal courts, the Supreme Court
had not considered the general meaning of the anti-fraud provisions in any decision
until 1963 when it decided SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.'5 7 That
was a proceeding for a preliminary injunction based on the and-fraud provision of
the Investment Advisers Act of i94o which, like the anti-fraud rules under the
Exchange Act, was modeled on section 17(a) of the Securities Act. 5 ' The defendant
it is hoped that volume 6, covering the period from Jan. 1, 1949 through Dec. 31, 195o, will be
published soon.
2" But see United States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. I96r), and the discussion of this decision is
the release cited supra note X41.
'.E.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., supra note 148; United States v. Benjamin,
supra note 147; Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (Zd Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S.
786 (1944).
'"
5 Supra note 151.
153 139 F.2d at 437.
U&. 27 S.E.C. 629 (1948).
'Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949):
2" Norris & Hirshberg v. SEC, 177 F.2d 228, 233 (D.C. Cir. x949); Archer v. SEC, 133 F.2d 795,
863 (8th Cir. x943). Although the courts approved these applications of the shingle and, fiduciary
theories, they did not discuss the theories as such. In his concurrence in Kahn v. SEC, 297 F.2d 112,
114 (2d Cir. z961), Judge Clark, who wrote the opinion in the first Hughes case, stated he had no
difficulty with the shingle theory.
'
5 7 Supra note 148.
1s Clauses (i) and (2) of § 206, the anti-fraud provision of the Investment Advlsers Act of .1940,
54 Stat. 8.5 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 8ob-6 (i958), are similar to clauses (z) and (3) of § Ij(a- of the
Securities Act. Clause (4) of § 2o6, a 196o amendment, 74 Stat. 887, resembles § 15(c) (i) of the
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adviser had engaged in the practice of buying shares of stock shortly before advising
the subscribers to its advisory service to buy the stock for long-term investment, and
selling its shares at a profit shortly after publishing and transmitting its recommenda-
tions to subscribers. This practice is known in the industry as "scalping" and is
designed to take advantage of the temporary market effect of a "buy" recommenda-
tion by an advisory service whose recommendations are widely disseminated. 60
The Commission, taking the position that such practice was a violation of the
adviser's fiduciary duty to his clients, sought to enjoin the distribution of the
advisory service containing the recommendations unless this practice was disclosed.
The district court and court of appeals denied the Commission's request on the
ground that such a practice was not prohibited by the anti-fraud provision of the
Investment Advisers Act. 6 ' The Supreme Court, however, found that the lower
courts had interpreted the provision in a technical and narrow common law sense,
and reversed their decisions on the ground that the practices operated "as a fraud
and deceit" under the broad remedial interpretation to which the statute was
entitled.
In coming to this conclusion the Court based much of its reasoning on the con-
gressional report leading to passage of the Investment Advisers Act, but also referred
to the conditions which preceded the 1933 and 1934 acts.1' The Court noted that
the Investment Advisers Act was the last of the statutes, dealing with the securities
industry, enacted after disclosure of the abuses which had occurred in the i92os.
Following the decision in the first Hughes case, the Court stated that a fundamental
purpose common to these statutes was "to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure
for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business
ethics in the securities industry,"' 2 and that Congress intended the Investment
Advisers Act to be construed "like other securities legislation 'enacted for the purpose
of avoiding frauds' not technically and restrictively, but rather flexibly to effectuate
its remedial purposes."'16 Thus, the omission of a provision similar to one contained
in the Securities Act making failure to disclose material facts unlawful was not
found to be controlling; instead the Court relied on the general proscription against
Exchange Act, and grants the Commission specific rule-making power to define and prevent fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative practices. The specific issue involved in the Capital Gains case was whether
the adviser's practice violated clause (2) of § 2o6. That clause made it unlawful for an investment
adviser "to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit
upon any client or prospective client" by the jurisdictional means.
... The Commission based the request for the injunction on six instances in which the investment
adviser had followed this practice and one instance in which the firm sold a security "short," recom-
mended that its clients sell the security, and then bought the security to cover its short sale at the lower
price after the recommendation was published. See the Appendix to the Court's opinion. 375 U.S. at
202.
140 191 F. Supp. 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), 300 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. ig6x), af'd on rehearing en bane,
306 F.2d ,6o6 (2d Cir. 1962).
161 375 U.S. at z86.
202 Ibid.
ld. at 195.
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fraudulent and deceptive practices contained in the act. It found the content of
this proscription in the modern, equitable concept of fraud which courts were
applying to commercial transactions at the time the Investment Advisers Act was
passed. The decision expressly rejected the view of the lower courts that the Com-
mission would have to rely on the rule-making power granted to it in the statute to
prevent scalping rather than on interpretation of the general anti-fraud provision.'64
Court review of Commission action in this area has performed the function,
noted by Judge Friendly, of causing "an agency to focus on the issues more closely
and to define its standards more sharply.' 0 This was shown in the recent series
of Commission and court decisions involving the broker-dealer firm of Mac Robbins
& Co. In its first opinion, the Commission found that the firm had sold securities
by fraudulent means and that nine of the firm's salesmen had participated in such
activities and were "causes" of the revocation of the firm's registration, 6' thus pre-
cluding their employment by any other registered broker-dealer or NASD member,
without prior Commission or NASD approval. Two of the salesmen appealed from
this administrative action. In oral argument before the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, the Commission indicated that, although its opinion did not expressly
reflect this view, its decision was based on the fact that the broker-dealer had been
conducting a boiler room, and that appellants had participated in its operation. As
the Supreme Court did in the first Chenery case,' 67 the court remanded the cases
to the Commission to make its theory of law dearer, and to respond to a series of
questions in light of its administrative expertise.' 63  Among the questions put by
the court were: (i) whether the Commission in its discussion of the use of the firm's
fraudulent sales materials by the salesmen intended to develop a universal rule for
sales conduct (whether or not part of a boiler-room operation); (2) whether partici-
pation in a boiler-room operation affected the scope of a salesman's responsibilities;
and (3) whether, in sales presentations, salesmen could rely on information furnished
by their employer. In its second opinion the Commission indicated that it had not
intended to articulate a rule covering salesmen in all contexts' 69 It found, however,
that in the case under consideration the salesmen were integral parts of the boiler-
room operation and should have known of the fraudulent character of the sales
literature the firm was using. In such a situation, it was stated, a salesman cannot
rely on materials furnished to him by his employer without a careful investigation
of their accuracy, particularly where there were adequate warning signs in the
literature. The Commission specifically based its decision on the duty of fair dealing
required of broker-dealers and their salesmen under the shingle theory. Upon
... ld. at 198.
' FRIENDLY 141.
1"" Mac Robbins & Co., 40 S.E.C. 497 (1961).
187 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 38 U.S. 8o (1943).
... Kahn v. SEC, 297 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. i96i); Berko v. SEC, 297 F.2d 1x6 (2d Cir. 1961). While
the analogy is not precise, the purpose and effect of the remand was the same in both situations.
"'Mac Robbins & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6846, at 12 (July 11, 1962).
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appeal, the court upheld this rule as a reasonable interpretation of the Exchange Act
as a remedial statuteiY°
COMMENT ON THE COMMISSION'S USE OF RULES, CASES, AND STATEMENTS OF POLICY
The different techniques employed by the Commission to develop standards
illustrate some of their merits and disadvantages. Formal rules can take the form
of flat prohibitions or disclosure requirements, or they can prescribe other preventive
means which could not have been as quickly or comprehensively developed by the
process of adjudication. They can be used to set guidelines for very complex matters
such as stabilization transactions. However, the rules in these complex areas tend
to be involved, and as fresh experience is acquired and abuses develop further inter-
pretation, either informally or in administrative proceedings, may be required.
A major problem recognized by courts is that very specific rules may permit
unethical persons to devise schemes to avoid them. 1  For this reason the Com-
mission has promulgated rules prescribing a general standard of conduct which
can be interpreted and applied to particular practices or courses of conduct in admin-
istrative proceedings, as well as specific rules dealing with relatively uncommon
practices.
Because of the unlimited variety of opportunities for unethical practices presented
in sales transactions, the Commission has relied heavily upon adjudication in
the development of standards for selling practices. The emphasis on the factual
context in administrative proceedings has provided a definite advantage in resolving
the issues and the policy considerations present in determining whether particular
conduct violated the anti-fraud provisions. In the early cases, the Commission used
broader language to describe the duty required of broker-dealers toward their
customers than may have been necessary to dispose of the particular issue before it.
The excessive price or secret profit cases are good examples. They provided the back-
ground against which the Commission developed the shingle and fiduciary theories
and formed a basis for later development of other important selling practice
standards. Of equal importance is the flexibility afforded by the case method because
of the discretion it offers in terms of application of the principle announced in a
particular case and the opportunity for further refinement or modification in later
cases.
The problems which would flow from the loss of this flexibility if agencies were
limited to formal rule-making powers in the development of standards are illustrated
by the Commission's efforts to curb boiler-room operations. Although the proposed
boiler-room rule was given thorough consideration by the Commission and staff
before it was released for public comment, the Commission has refrained from
17 Berko v. SEC, supra note 149.
171 "Fraud is infinite, and were a Court of Equity to once lay down rules, how far they ivould go,
and no farther, in extending their relief against it, or to define strictly the species or evidence of it, the
jurisdiction would be cramped, and perpetually eluded by new schemes which the fertility of man's in-
vention would contrive." Letter of Lord Hardwicke to Lord Kames dated June 30, 1759, cited 'i nthv
Capital Gains decision, 375 U.S. at 193 n.4I.
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declaring the rule effective. In contrast, the decisions in the proceedings concerning
boiler rooms have articulated standards of conduct for broker-dealers and have
greatly aided the Commission's efforts to put such firms and their salesmen out of
business. And, as indicated, they achieve this without the claimed disadvantages of
the proposed formal rule.
Another example of the flexibility provided by adjudication, as well as of the
importance of the factual context provided by cases, is the principle which the Com-
mission enunciated in Cady, Roberts & Co. 7 2  That case broadly concerned the
duties of all persons possessing non-public information as a result of a special
relationship with an issuer of securities, but it dealt specifically with the duties of a
broker-dealer in possession of such information. In earlier cases, the Commission
had indicated that a broker-dealer who is purchasing securities for an insider and
knows that the insider possesses non-public information has a duty to disclose the
information to the seller or disassociate himself from the transaction,'" and also
that sales by a broker-dealer by means of representations which he knew to be mis-
leading because of confidential information received from an issuer violated the
anti-fraud provisions." 4 In Cady, Roberts, the broker had executed sales on an
exchange for his discretionary accounts because of his knowledge of a dividend
reduction, not yet publicly announced, which he received from a director of the
corporation who was an employee of his brokerage firm. The Commission held
that, because of the broker's special access to corporate information and the unfair-
ness of executing such sales before the information became public, these sales violated
the anti-fraud provisions. The broker could only have avoided the violations by
disclosing the information before effecting the transactions, or, if that were im-
practicable, by foregoing the transaction. Under the circumstances presented, the
Commission indicated that the proper course would have been to forego the trans-
actions until news of the dividend reduction had been made public' 75
The Commission rejected respondents' argument that the action was compelled
by the fiduciary duty which was owed to owners of the discretionary accounts.
This case has significance because it applies the high standards required of corporate
insiders, ie., officers, directors and controlling stockholders, to a broker-dealer who
was not an insider but received information from an insider with whom he was
associated, and because it applies to sales on an exchange where the broker-dealer
makes no representations and, in fact, has no actual contact with the purchaser.
There is, at least, reasonable question whether the Commission would have promul-
gated a general formal rule embodying the standard of conduct enunciated in this
case without an actual situation involving improper conduct before it and without
the benefit of having the competing arguments of law and policy which are fre-
quently most sharply drawn in adjudicatory proceedings. Furthermore, there would
172 40 S.E.C. 907 (Ig6i).17 1 Hughes & Treat, 22 S.E.C. 623, 626 (1946).
Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., 33 S.E.C. 311, 321 (1952)...
17 40 S.E.C. 907, at 915.
716 LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
seem to be little point in attempting to draft a series of rules having only a specific
and limited application, particularly since it would be virtually impossible to reach
the myriad situations which could arise. Removal of the adjudication power from
the Commission could thus hinder or preclude the opportunity for, the development
of such a rule as well as deny the Commission the insight which the adjudication
of cases provides to it in connection with all of its regulatory activities, whether
formal or informal.
The flexibility provided by adjudication so necessary for the development of
selling practice standards has not been of equal importance in other areas of Com-
mission responsibility. For example, as another paper in this symposium indicates,"'0
the Commission has relied on detailed formal rules and informal procedures to
perform the task of regulation of proxy solicitations assigned to it. It has utilized
a similar approach in developing and announcing policies as to disclosures required
in new offerings of securities under the Securities Act" 7 and in connection with
registration for trading on the exchanges. 1 s Because of the great number of registra-
tion statements, annual and other reports, applications, sales literature, and proxy
statements which the Commission reviews each year and the necessity for expeditious
treatment, particularly in the case of proxy solicitations and new issues of securities,
it would be impracticable to use formal administrative proceedings as a regular
means to process them even though the statutes seem to provide expressly for such
proceedings to test their accuracy and adequacy. 79 Furthermore, these materials
only infrequently raise questions of fraudulent conduct comparable to that found
in the sales practice area. The Commission developed, at the beginning of its
administration of these provisions, informal procedures which provide an effective and
efficient means of assuring statutory compliance. These procedures and the Com-
mission's willingness to provide informal interpretative and other assistance to
those affected by the statutes have been the subject of favorable comment."s The
Commission has attempted to match the administrative device to the statutory
objective in developing relevant policies concerning regulated activities.
Adjudication also seems to provide an advantage for the enunciation of policies
because of the different reactions by interested persons and the Bar to a policy stated
in a case and to one enunciated in a formal rule. When an agency publishes a
proposed rule for comment there is a tendency to evaluate it in terms of the maxi-
mum possible scope of its language. Objectors envision highly unusual factual situa-
tions which might conceivably fall within the literal wording of the rule. The
creators of these ingenious hypothetical cases find little comfort in the obvious answer
-that no sensible administrator, and certainly no reviewing court, would interpret
... Von Mehren & McCarroll, The Proxy Rules: A Case Study in the Administrative Process, 29 LAw
& CoTraaP. PROB. 728 (1964).
IT i Loss 272-77.
178 2 Loss 792-95.
I" Securities Act § 8; Exchange Act § 19(a) ().
... TAsx FORCE RaEPorT ON LGAz. SErvicEs AND PxocEDuREs, Comsioss oN OomAnom oP Tim
ExacuTivE BRAScu x8g, 1gi (1955); Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure, S. Doc. No. 8, 7 7 th Cong., Ist Sess. 39 (1941).
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the rule to cover such extreme cases. By contrast, a statement in an adjudicatory
opinion is evaluated against the specific factual context. There is a general under-
standing that the precedential value of an opinion is limited by the underlying facts.
Though an opinion foreshadows future developments, there is an awareness that
its dictum will not be applied literally in every conceivable circumstance.
Without losing the advantages of adjudication in developing new standards,
agencies can obtain certain other benefits by codifying in formal rules or public
statements standards already established in administrative proceedings. This can
serve to resolve any minor inconsistencies and also to provide a single readily
available source for those seeking to ascertain agency policy. The Commission has
done this for broker-dealer selling practice standards to some degree by the statements
on the duties of broker-dealers selling unregistered securities181 and the problems
involved in the distribution of "hot issues.'
8 2
Such codification has occurred to a greater extent under the Securities Act.
Probably the most important rules under that statute are those defining the terms
used in sections 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the statute which determine the types of securities
and transactions to which the registration requirements of the act apply. A number
of proceedings involving these provisions have led to the development of new
rules or the modification of existing ones. Examples are rule 133 which embodies
the principle that "no sale" is involved in statutory mergers and acquisitions,' 83 rule
155 concerning the non-public sale and subsequent distribution of convertible securi-
ties or the securities underlying them,84 and rule 154 which relates to the exemption
from registration for ordinary brokerage transactions." 5
A number of reasons may be assigned for the restatement of these policies under
the 1933 Act in formal rules after considering them in adjudicatory proceedings.
Probably most important is the need for certainty in transactions to which the
Securities Act may apply, which often involve many millions of dollars and a
variety of persons, issuers, underwriters, dealers and their counsel and accountants.
The act imposes what amounts almost to an absolute civil liability on an issuer and
persons participating in an illegal distribution of securities. Because of the Commis-
sion's practice of furnishing administrative interpretations with respect to the
necessity of registering securities, there is a strong inducement to insure equal treat-
ment and to reduce staff workload by articulating these standards as precisely as
possible and publishing them widely in the form of rules. On the other hand, the
variety of selling efforts and the need for flexibility to prevent technical avoidance
make rules fixing standards in this area less suitable for articulation in formal
rules than standards for determining which transactions require registration under
'
8 1 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4445 and Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6721 (Feb. 2, 1962).
2 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. o6097 (Oct. 23, 1959).
a See Great Sweet Grass Oils, Ltd. 37 S.E.C. 683 (i957); i Loss 528-39.
:" See Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., SEC Securities Act Release No. 3825 (Aug. 12, 1957); i Loss
665-86.
8
' Ira Haupt & Co., 23 S.E.C. 589 (1946); x Loss 700-06.
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the Securities Act. Moreover, the tendency, already noticed, for the self-regulatory
organizations to codify these standards and the guidance they offer to their member-
ships decrease the need to articulate the selling practice policies as precisely as
those concerning registration of securities. Despite these differences, additional
case developed selling practice standards may be appropriate for codification by
formal rule or statement of policy when the Commission has had sufficient experience
with them.
Public statements are subject to some limitations as tools for policy development.
The very essence of the administrative process is that only through constant exposure
and cumulative experience can the agency develop and formulate appropriate policy.
As problems arise, an agency must make policy determinations promptly not only
to meet its statutory responsibilities, but also to guide those affected. Many of these
policy determinations involve unique fact situations or otherwise have limited
application. Others may represent initial reactions to emerging problems of greater
significance. It would be unwise to publish such informal administrative policy
interpretations before they are adequately tested. Not only would there be loss of
administrative flexibility, but premature publication of policies derived from limited
experience might lead to confusion and retard modification suggested by greater
experience. On the other hand, when experience permits enunciation and publication
of thoroughly considered policy determinations, there seems to be little difference
between a statement of policy and a formal rule. In fact, statements of policy may
have the disadvantage of not having the legal effect of a rule should the Commission
later attempt to take administrative or court action for violation of the policies
reflected in the statement. And, persons who rely upon Commission rules are
provided certain statutory protection, if the rule is later changed or invalidated, not
afforded those who rely on statements of policy186
The functions for which statements of policy seem best suited are as warnings or
as explanations of how the agency intends to deal with specific fact situations or of
certain informal administrative procedures. An example of a statement of policy
serving as a warning device under the Securities Act is the Commission's "Canadian
Restricted List." This list, which is periodically brought up to date, indicates the
Canadian issuers of securities which the Commission believes are being distributed
in this country in violation of the securities registration requirements, and thus alerts
broker-dealers to the fact that they may be violating the act by participating in illegal
distributions if they execute customers' orders for these securities187 An example of
a statement designed to publicize informal procedures is the release recently pub-
"' Securities Act § ig(a); Securities Exchange Act § 23(a). As a practical matter, the Commission
does not take action against a party who has relied on a written or oral interpretation made by a
member of the staff.187 From 1951 until I956, the list was distributed by the NASD, but since then the Commission
has published it as a release under the Securities Act. SEC Securities Act Release No. 3632 (April 24,
1956). The latest version of the list was published on May 8, 1964. SEC Securities Act Release No.
4689. The use of the Canadian Restricted List as a warning device for broker-dealers has been upheld
by the courts. Kukatush Mining Corp. v. SEC, 309 F.2d 647 (D.C. Cir. x962).
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lished by the Commission describing certain established administrative practices
which the staff follows in the processing of registration statements under the Securi-
ties Act of I933.1s s Although the publication of this release was intended as an aid
to issuers and their counsel and to insure uniform staff treatment of registration
statements, this effort has not been universally acclaimed.""'
CRITICISM OF THE COMBINATION OF ADJUDICATION AND
OmmT FUNCTIONS IN ONE AGENCY
Closely related to the charge that the agencies have failed to develop adequate
standards is the criticism of the combination in one agency of adjudication with
enforcement, policy-making and planning functions. Earlier criticism was based
on the view that the exercise of these functions by one body violated the principle
that the same man or group should not be both prosecutor and judge. 9 ' More
recent criticism is based on the conclusion that the time and effort involved in
deciding individual cases interfere with the agencies main task of developing
and enforcing specific policies under general statutory mandates. 9' This may be
another way of expressing the view that adjudication is inefficient and inadequate
for proper development of policies and standards. The solution most generally
proposed to deal with the problems claimed to exist is that adjudication be
separated from other agency functions, either by turning over these functions to the
regular federal courts or to a special administrative court system somewhat similar
to that found in Continental countries, or by keeping the adjudicatory function
within the agency but setting up internal barriers between it and other activities in
which the agency is engaged.' 92 The proposals for external separation are designed
to avoid the alleged inefficiency of adjudication for policy development as well as to
insure fairness; suggestions for internal separation are aimed primarily at the second
of these goals.
Recent examples of proposals calling for external separation are the memorandum
submitted to the President by Louis Hector on his resignation from the Civil
Aeronautics Board in I95993 and the letter sent to the President four years later
by Newton Minow on his resignation as Chairman of the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC)?4 Mr. Hector contended that the combination of functions
188 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4666 (Feb. 7, 1964).
"' A special committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York recently indicated
that it felt that this release and another which the Commission recently published on Rule 154 under
the Securities Act, SEC Securities Act Release No. 4669 (Feb. 17, 1964), were attempts to make rules with-
out observing procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. Other securities practitioners,
however, have indicated that, although the releases may have defects, their publication is helpful. E.g.,
Israels, Notes and Views, N.Y. Law Journal, Mar. 26, z964, p. T.
... See 2 DAvis § 13.01.
"'Letter from Newton N. Minow to the President, May 31, 1963 (available from the Federal
Communications Commission); Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commis-
sions, 69 YALE L.J. 931, 933-35, 953-57 (rg6o).
... See 2 DAvis § 13.03.
1".Snpra note 191.
"' Supra note 191.
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made the CAB inefficient and that its adjudication procedures were unfair to the
persons affected. He generalized from this that the policy-making, adjudicatory,
administrative and investigative duties, which are vested in most independent
agencies, were by their nature incompatible. Therefore, he proposed giving the
agencies' policy-making and planning functions to new executive branch agencies,
their adjudicatory functions to an administrative court, and the enforcement functions
of investigation and prosecution to an executive department or agency which already
performs such duties (for example, the Justice Department). Mr. Minow limited
his remarks to the operations of the FCC, but agreed basically with Mr. Hector.
However, he proposed splitting the FCC's activities between a single administrator
and an administrative court instead of the three groups proposed by Mr. Hector.'
Despite their frequency over a period of about twenty-five years, proposals for com-
plete severance of adjudication from other agency functions have been adopted, and
then in modified form, for only one major agency, the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB).'
Unlike proposals for external separation, those for internal separation have had
more acceptance. The proposals in this regard made by the majority of the Attorney
General's Committee on Administrative Procedure in 194I 1 7 were substantially em-
bodied in the Administrative Procedure Act when it was passed in 1946.10' The
basic effect of the internal separation provision in section 5(c) of the Admnistrative
Procedure Act is to insure that the decisional officers will not be persons involved
in the investigation or prosecution of a case.' 99 It also prohibits consultation by the
decisional officers with any party to the proceeding without notice and opportunity
for all parties to participate.
COMMISSION'S INTERNAL SEPARATION OF FUNCTIONS
The Commission had a system of internal separation of functions to achieve
fairness and impartiality in adjudicatory proceedings before enactment of the Admin-
istrative Procedure ActY°° Thus, only minor changes and refinements were made
when the act was passed.
When testimony and other evidence must be taken, as is the case in all con-
"' Since this article is primarily concerned with the operations of an agency which exercises adjudi-
catory functions, no effort is made to discuss the merits of the different forms proposed for establishing
external separation of functions.
1952 DAVIs § 13.04. Congress has also increased the extent of the separation of functions required
for the FCC, although not going as far as it did with the NLRB. Ibid.
..
7 Report of Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, supra note i8o, at 55-60.
"' 60 Stat. 237-44 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1oo1-Il (1958). A study completed shortly after the release
of the report of the Attorney General's Committee indicated that many agencies had already adopted
a substantial separation of functions for the purpose of achieving impartiality in their actions. Nathanson,
Separation of Funcions Within Federal Administrative Agendes, 35 ILL. L. Rav. 9ox (941). One
legal historian believes that such separation in the larger agencies was also the natural result of the
growth of business and the need for division of labor. WILLARD HuRsr, THu GRowTis ov AMEUAoN
LAw 430 (1950).
" Agency members, i.e., Commissioners, are exempt from this prohibition. See p. 722 infra.0
'Nathanson, supra note x98, at 921-24.
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tested broker-dealer revocation or denial proceedings, hearings are held before a
hearing officer who is completely independent of the staff members who investigated
the matter or who are participating in the proceedings. This officer is not allowed
to confer ex parte about any of the facts in issue in the proceeding with Commission
counsel, or any others, participating in the case. The investigation which precedes
initiation of adjudicatory proceedings is conducted, and the charges in the proceed-
ings are prosecuted, by the division of the Commission having enforcement or
regulatory responsibility for such matters. Hearings in broker-dealer proceedings
are usually held in the locality where the alleged violations occurred and are
conducted by the personnel of the particular regional office of the Commission for
that geographical area in conjunction with the Division of Trading and Markets,
which has the primary responsibility for broker-dealer regulation. The Commission's
permanent staff of hearing officers, known as hearing examiners, is assigned to the
executive staff of the Commission. They are not subject to the supervision of
any employee engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecutive functions.
Staff members involved in the proceedings may not participate in the drafting of a
decision by the hearing examiner and, if a decision by him is waived by the parties,
such staff members may not assist the Commission in the preparation of its decision
unless the parties agree to their participation. In noncontested broker-dealer proceed-
ings in which the facts have been stipulated, the respondents often agree to such
participation in the decisional process to expedite disposition of the case.
In addition to the hearing examiners, the Commission has an independent
decisional division, the Office of Opinions and Review (formerly the Office of
Opinion Writing). As its title suggests, the primary responsibility of this office is
the drafting of final opinions under the instructions of the Commission, either after
hearing and decision by the hearing examiner or de novo when such procedures
have been waived. Opinions and Review personnel are under the same restrictions
as are hearing examiners, so far as discussion of issues of a case are concerned.
A question concerning agency separation of functions is whether an allegation
of a violation of the separation of function requirement permits court review of the
administrative proceedings before they have been completed. Three recent decisions
by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia illustrate some
of the underlying issues involved in answering this question. These decisions all
involved the Commission, but have significance for all agencies subject to the
Administrative Procedure Act.
In the first decision, R. A. Holman & Co. v. SEC,2 ' the court upheld the refusal
of the district court to enjoin broker-dealer revocation proceedings because the alleged
procedural irregularities-lack of a quorum and ex parte communications between
the Commission and the staff-were not of such a fundamental nature that the court
would interfere at that stage of the proceedings. The court stated that the Commis-
sion should be given the opportunity to correct the irregularities if any existed. The
201 299 F.2d 1227 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 911 (1962).
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court also pointed out that, in any event, these allegations might not prove to be
reversible error upon appeal after the administrative proceedings were completed.
Shortly thereafter, the same court of appeals reached a different result in a similar
case in which the senior author was somewhat painfully involved, Amos Treat &
Co. v. SEC.202 Plaintiff sought an injunction against continuance of a broker-
dealer revocation proceeding on the ground that the author's participation in the
consideration of the case as a member of the Commission violated due process of
law and section 5(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act because he had previously
served as director of a division of the staff which had been involved in an investi-
gation of a factually-related proceeding.203 On appeal from the district court's
dismissal of the complaint, the Commission argued first that the questions raised
by plaintiff should be determined on an appeal from the Commission's final order
in the proceedings, but also that the author's participation did not violate due
process and that he was exempted from the operation of section 5(c) by its last clause
which provides that it does not apply "in any manner to the agency or any member
or members of the body comprising the agency." 2°4  The court, however, went
directly to the merits of plaintiff's contentions and interpreted section 5(c) only to
permit an agency member to vote on initiation of an investigation or proceeding and
still adjudicate the matter when it reached the decision stage. The court ordered,
"solely on due process grounds," that an injunction issue and that it be made
permanent unless the proceedings were terminated or the Commission held a full
evidentiary hearing on the question whether the author should have been dis-
qualified because of prior staff participation in the case.205
In a second decision involving R. A. Holman & Co., plaintiff made the same
charges as in the Treat case, but in this case the court denied the injunction." 0
The court held that the decision in the Treat case rested on the record established
there and that was an "exceptional" case. Here, the allegation that another Com-
missioner had actively participated in the investigation as a division director was
formally denied by the Commission, whereas in the Treat case the Commission
had moved to dismiss the complaint without formally answering the allegations.
In this case, the court held that plaintiff would first have to exhaust all of its
administrative remedies, before raising a question of violation of due process. The
court recognized that to do otherwise would greatly hinder the efficiency of the
administrative process by making it subject to many delays by persons against whom
2o 3o6 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
501Petitioners expressly disclaimed charging the author with personal bias or prejudice and indi-
cated that their request was based on the fact that as the director of the division he had been responsible
for all of its activities, including the investigation of the factually related matter. 3o6 F.ad at 265.204 The Commission also argued that the issue of the author's participation was moot because he had
disqualified himself from further consideration of the proceedings.
'0' If the first of these alternatives were chosen, the Commission was expressly permitted to reinstitute
the proceedings, so long as the author did not participate further, and that is what was done.
20 R. A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 323 F.2d 284 (D.C. Cir. 1963), ceri. denied, 375 U.S. 943 (1963).
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proceedings might be taken.2°  The problems implicit in these decisions will
undoubtedly receive further consideration.208
DELEGATION OF ADJUDICATION FUNCTIONS
The Commission has recently taken certain actions in regard to the conduct of its
administrative proceedings which should improve the efficiency of adjudication as
a tool for policy development within its system of internal separation of functions.
As indicated earlier, the modern advocates of external separation of functions believe
that is necessary to free agencies from routine adjudication so that they will have
more time to devote to policy making. Although, as shown, adjudication is a
valuable, indeed a necessary, tool for policy making, it must be admitted that many
administrative proceedings are routine and do not present difficult or important ques-
tions. Therefore, the prime concern of the agency is to insure that the statutory and
administrative standards are applied fairly. Both aims can be achieved by a careful
system of delegating decisional authority within the agency. The Administrative
Procedure Act authorizes this by allowing agencies either to adopt an "initial"
decision procedure, whereby the decision of the hearing officer becomes final unless
it is appealed to the agency or the agency reviews the case on its own motion, or a
''recommended" decision procedure, whereby the decision of the hearing officer is
only advisory and the agency must consider the case and promulgate its own order. 20 9
Apart from this, specific authority to delegate the power to decide cases, within certain
limitations, was granted to the Commission in 1962.10
Traditionally, the Commission has employed the recommended decision pro-
cedure. This course was viewed as necessary in light of the large number of im-
portant policy questions involved in adjudicatory proceedings under most of the
statutes which the Commission administers. And, in proceedings under the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 and the Investment Company Act of x94o,
many of which technically are rule-making under the Administrative Procedure Act,
the parties frequently sought a Commission decision as promptly as possible. In
these circumstances, an initial decision by a hearing examiner might serve only to
prolong proceedings without significantly aiding in their disposition.
The Commission has a corps of experienced and competent hearing examiners.
Many major policy questions under the statutes have been solved and guidelines
as to others have been enunciated and refined. In consequence, the Commission has
recently proposed that an initial decision procedure take the place of the recom-
mended decision procedure.21' Under the proposed rule changes, initial decisions
:17 323 F.2d at 287.
'o0 Law, Disqualification of SEC Commissioners Appointed From the Staff: Amos Treat, R. A. Holman,
and the Threat to Expertise, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 257 (1964); 64 COLT. L. REV. 785 (1964)-
Administrative Procedure Act § (8) (a), 6o Stat. 242 (946), 5 U.S.C. § 1007(a) (1954).
o10 76 Stat. 394 (x962), 15 U.S.C. § 78d-i (Supp. IV, 1963).
311 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4687 (May 1, 1964).
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will be issued in any administrative proceeding in which a hearing officer is used
under all of the statutes administered by the Commission.
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, agencies have the power to "limit the
issues upon notice or by rule" when review of an initial decision procedure is
sought.21 The Commission has had a rule requiring that an exception to a hearing
examiner's decision be briefed or the exception will be deemed to have been waived.218
The proposed initial decision procedure also provides that the person appealing from
the hearing examiner's decision must establish that the decision includes either
a finding of fact or law which is clearly erroneous or some other important deter-
mination which the agency should review; otherwise, the Commission may deny
the -petition for review or summarily affirm the hearing examiner's decision. 14
Whether or not a petition for review is filed, the Commission will be able to bring
decisions up for review on its own motion when it feels that is necessary or
appropriate.
Decisional authority in other respects has been delegated to reduce the number
of routine matters requiring Commission attention. The Commission has always
followed an extremely liberal policy of considering appeals from rulings by hearing
examiners on interlocutory motions during the administrative proceedings, a policy
which encouraged dilatory maneuvers by some respondents. Recently, the Commis-
sion changed its rules of practice to reduce the number of interlocutory appeals
which it will consider. Power has been delegated to the Office of Opinions and
Review to affirm the refusal by hearing examiners to certify to the Commission
rulings on these motions or to affirm the hearing examiners' rulings on motions
when the hearing examiners do certify them to the Commission21 On matters
that do not fall within settled precedent or where the decision may otherwise be
significant, the director of that office will bring the matter to the Commission for
determination.
,In connection with certain administrative proceedings, including those relating
to broker-dealer registration, the Commission has delegated to the Office of Opinions
and Review the power to issue the final order taking the remedial action described
in the order for proceedings when the parties have consented to such action, failed
to appear, or failed to file required answers in such proceedings 210  The 196: dele-
gation 6f functions statute has also made it possible for the Commission to delegate
many routine matters in non-adjudicatory areas and thus to devote more time to
policy consideration in all its regulatory activities including significant administrative
pro&e6dings.217
212 A'dministrative Procedure Act § 8(a), supra note 209. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 84 (1947).
-
2 1 SEC Rule of Practice 17(a), 17 C.F.R. § 201.7(a) (1963).
"' Clause (d) of proposed Rule of Practice 17, supra note 211, at vi-vsi.
21. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4674 (Mar. 5, 964).
21" SEC Securities Act Release No. 4684 (April 8, 1964).
"'SEC Securities Act Release No. 4588 (Mar, 8, 1963).
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CONCLUSIONS
Through formal rule-making, adjudication, and the use of statements of policy,
the Commission has developed and enunciated a code of selling practice standards
under the anti-fraud provisions of the securities acts. Each of the three procedures
has been valuable in performing this task; adjudication seems to have been par-
ticularly appropriate and extremely important primarily because of the flexibility
it provides218 Adjudication has made it possible for the Commission to develop
policies by moving gradually from problem to problem and to consider the effect of
prior' decisions. Such an evolutionary development makes possible the further testing
of policy against the background of live situations rather than imagined possibilities.
At the same time, the Commission has maintained internal separation of func-
tions, as required by the Administrative Procedure Act to insure impartiality in
adjudicative proceedings. Although the Holman and Treat cases indicate that all
of the issues in that area are not resolved, the problem presented by those cases should
not prove to be a major obstacle to efficient administrative action. While maintaining
internal separation of functions, the Commission has taken steps to improve the
efficiency of adjudication as a tool for policy making as well as to provide' more time
for developing policy by the other means available to it.
Our discussion was intended to illustrate the value of adjudication as a means
of developing standards in appropriate situations. However, although it cannot be
precisely measured, the experience and the expertise derived from the adjudication
of formal proceedings has greatly benefited the Commission in all areas of the Com-
mission's regulatory activities, including formal rule making. The adjudication
of cases provides a feedback process for evaluating previously developed policies
as well as a means of giving the Commission a factual basis for deciding what new
policies are required by the changes constantly taking place in the industry. On the
other hand, the knowledge of the operation of the securities industry gained from the
Commission's constant informal regulatory activities results in better understanding
of the real issues involved in, the formal administrative proceedings which the
Commission decides. Thus external separation of adjudication of cases from other
regulatory activities would result in creating a regulatory agency and adjudicatory
body, each of which would be less knowledgeable than an agency responsible for
both activities. This conclusion seems especially apt in the case of an agency such
as the Commission which performs a great many of its regulatory functions on an
informal basis.
The Commission's efforts in the selling, practice area suggest the complexities
involved in performing but one of the tasks assigned to a rather small agency, and
they point up the weaknesses of proposals for improving the administrative process
218 See Massel, The Regulalory Process, 26 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. i8i, 188 (z'6z).
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by single concept or universal solutions such as complete external separation of
functions. As one commentator has stated, agencies are "government in small,"
possessing all or many of government's powers in the regulated area and plagued
by all or many of the problems faced by comprehensive governmental action.210
A major error in certain of the recent criticisms of the administrative process
is the failure to recognize the limits of governmental action in regulating a segment
of the economy, especially when that regulation is subject to the proper limitations
which are imposed on it in a constitutional democracy such as ours. The criticism
also ignores the problems in imposing an effective regulatory scheme on the rapidly
changing technologies of regulated industries. Perhaps of more fundamental im-
portance, some of the criticism and certain of the proposals ignore the basic ideas
behind the creation of administrative agencies.
Professor Hurst, in his history of American legal institutions, lists four basic
reasons for the creation of the specialized agencies: the desire for expertness in the
particular area to be regulated; the conviction that a specialized agency could handle
better the necessarily large volume of work by giving undivided attention to the
administrative details involved; and the beliefs that agencies could develop policy and
help Congress construct long-range programs, and, because of the circumstances of
their creation, that they would enforce the policies of their enabling statutes in a
vigorous manner.' 0 He believes that these reasons required an organization which,
on the one hand, could keep in view the general policy of the statute and, on the
other, could know what that policy meant in terms of individual application. In
his view, these needs required a merger of legislative, executive, and judicial functions
in a single body since separation of the judicial from the other functions would tend
to make the agency more prosecution than policy-minded and would hinder the
agency's main task--"the informal disposition of a great volume of matters without
contest. Proposals which would impose uniform procedures on all administrative
agencies and which would "judicialize" many types of informal proceedings ignore
these reasons for the specialized agency and the character of much of its work.
The authors do not have any panaceas for the alleged ills of the administrative
process, but believe that several of the proposals already made by others, particularly
the proposal for a permanent Administrative Conference, offer real hope for im-
provement of agency operations. Unquestionably more can and should be done, as
Judge Friendly urges, to define, to articulate, and to publish the standards of ad-
ministrative action. The recruitment of able men at all levels of agency operation
and their retention by the payment of adequate salaries are acknowledged necessities
for effective agency performance. Constructive criticism is another essential require-
ment for agency improvement. Agencies and administrators are not intransigent
' Fick, Issues and Accomplishments in Administrative Regtdation: Some Political Aspects, 26 LAw
& COtTMP. PROB. 283, 294 (196i).
22 Huasr, op. cit. supra note 198, at 421-23.
... Id. at 430.
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when they can be shown that changes in procedure will result in improvement.
Federal agencies have already implemented a great many of the recommendations
of the i961-62 Administrative Conference."' The Commission has benefited greatly
from the evaluation and criticism of its performance by the Special Study of
Securities Markets" as well as from the important accomplishment of that group
in studying and describing the changes which have taken place in the securities
industry in the last thirty years. Studies of other industries and the agencies regu-
lating them may be of similar benefit. The proposed permanent Administrative
Conference will serve as a clearinghouse for the interchange of ideas among agency
personnel, scholars of the law and government, and private persons. Since the
primary and only goal of the Conference will be the improvement of the admin-
istrative process and its membership will include many knowledgeable persons from
within and outside the government, its recommendations will not not be subject to
criticism as reflecting the points of view of persons with special interests. Finally,
considering the original reasons behind the creation of administrative agencies,
experimentation in procedures and the organization of agencies should be en-
couraged. 2 4
"'As of Dec. 31, 1962, the date on which the Conference concluded its business, agencies had
already put into effect about 55% of the recommendations which could be carried out by administrative
action and steps were under way or specifically proposed for another 2o% of the recommendations.
Memorandum of the Bureau of the Budget, June 13, 1963. We have been informed that many more
recommendations have been put into effect since that time.
-. Special Study, pt. 4, at 692-728.
2 The proposal to create an official, similar to the Scandinavian "Ombudsman," who would have
the responsibility of investigating complaints by private individuals of improper actions by departments
and agencies of the government seems to offer attractive possibilities. Gellhorn, Administrative Procedure
Reform: Hardy Perennial, 48 A.B.A.J. 243, 248 (1962); Davis, Ombudsmen in America: Officers to
Criticize Administrative Action, io9 U. PA. L. Rav. 1057 (i96i).
